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identification and location system being developed as part of the
STRUCTURES project.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The possible use of Intentional Electromagnetic
Interference (IEMI) to disrupt critical infrastructure is
becoming a significant concern [1]. One aspect of this threat is
detecting the cause of a system failure. A failure due to IEMI
may be blamed on faulty hardware or software, and much time
and money may be wasted on searching for the cause,
particularly if the failure is intermittent. It is therefore
beneficial to consider how IEMI attacks may be detected. A
number of IEMI detector systems have been developed
previously such as those in references [2] and [3] which can
detect IEMI. Although reference [4] describes a system that
can determine the direction to the IEMI source, we have not
been able to find references describing practical systems
capable of determining the complete location of the source. In
this paper we describe a low cost detection system being
developed as part of the STRUCTURES programme. The
STRUCTURES programme is one of several EU funded
research programmes evaluating the effects of IEMI on critical
infrastructure, including protection and detection. A
complementary identification and location system is also being
designed and a brief description is included in this paper for
comparative purposes.
II. DETECTOR DESIRABLES
The three most important requirements for the detection
system are the ability to detect an IEMI attack and generate an
alarm, to send the received data for logging and post-
The research leading to these results has been implemented in
the framework of the Project STRUCTURES co-funded by the
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processing, and to be cost-efficient. Additional features, such
as locating and/or identifying the source of the attack, require
designing a significantly more complex system, which is thus
likely to be more expensive. Within the STRUCTURES
project we are developing both, low-cost and high-
performance detectors outlined in this paper.
A. Detection of threat
Clearly the first desirable property of a detector is that it
can successfully detect the presence of an IEMI threat. False
alarms should also be minimized. A field detector must have
some means of discriminating between IEMI threats and other
intentional or accidental sources such as mobile phones and
electrostatic discharge. For simple detectors the discrimination
between threat and other fields might be largely based on the
level, though this can also be aided by ensuring that the
detector is located away from expected transmitters such as
mobile phones. A more complex system might be able to
discriminate on the basis of frequency content and/or the time
domain waveform. Similarly, a conducted interference detector
must be able to differentiate between “normal” levels of
transient and noise on a wire and that introduced by IEMI.
Since most radiated IMEI sources are likely to use high
gain antennas with narrow beam widths, it seems advantageous
that a number of detectors are placed around any sensitive
equipment, sufficiently close together that at least one detector
will see the beam of any attack, even if it is slightly mis-
directed.
The susceptibility level of equipment used in industrial
applications should be greater than 10 V/m and typical failure
levels can be considerably higher and tend to increase with
frequency [5][6]. Therefore, a detector should be sensitive to
levels above 10 V/m and if the detector is placed between the
source and equipment to be protected, it is likely to have an
alarm threshold considerably greater than 10 V/m.
Sources are available at ever increasing frequencies but
their complexity increases with frequency. Although the
majority of available sources operate below 3 GHz [7],
detection at higher frequencies is desirable to allow for future
developments.
B. Communication and logging
In order to allow notification of a threat and subsequent
analysis (forensics) of the time, duration and number of attacks,
some mechanism is required for the data from a number of
sensors to be communicated to a local or remote monitoring
and logging system, to send alerts and alarm indications (e.g. to
a security office).
C. Identification of threat
Identification of the type of interfering signal is desirable,
partly to discriminate between signals that may not be IEMI,
such as a nearby mobile phone, and partly to aid in tracking the
source of interference. A simple system is likely to be able to
determine simple waveform features such as whether the threat
is CW, long or short pulse, but will be unable to observe details
of very fast rise time or short pulses. A more sophisticated
system may seek to determine frequency, rise-time, Pulse
Repetition Frequency (PRF), etc. which can provide a picture
of the source type in use.
D. Location of threat
Location of the source of the threat would enable action to
be taken to identify and apprehend the perpetrators of the
attack. It is possible that a simple system can give some
indication of the location of a threat if a large number of
detectors are used, simply by observing which detectors are
triggered. A more complex system can use many techniques for
direction finding, such as those based on antenna directivity,
time difference of arrival, etc.
E. Cost
Any practical detector system will also have to be
affordable. A low cost system may only be able to detect the
presence of a possible threat, whereas a system capable of
identifying and locating the threat is likely to be more
expensive. Within the STRUCTURES project we are
developing both low-cost and high performance detectors
outlined in this paper.
III. A MODULAR DETECTOR SYSTEM
Here we propose a concept of a modular IEMI detector
system and discuss how one such system can be upgraded to
achieve localization and identification of an IEMI source.
A. Low cost detectors
Figure 1. shows the concept of the low-cost IEMI detection
system being developed in the STRUCTURES project.
Multiple sensors are coupled to a (protected) computer system
for warning, logging and analysis. Optical fibre
communications provide robust communications, though
wireless or wired links may be desirable in some cases.
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Figure 1. Low cost IEMI detector system concept
The block diagram for individual low-cost detectors is
shown in Figure 2. In a low cost system it is desirable that each
detector unit operate on battery power for extended periods.
Low-power consumption could be achieved with the assistance
or solar or other scavenged energy sources.
Low power operation is possible for many microcontrollers,
and wireless links such as Zigbee [8]. Optical links can also be
operated at very low power consumption levels, making battery
operation possible. Wired network connections tend to have
much higher power consumption requirements but power over
Ethernet is becoming readily available.
Whilst commercial broadband logarithmic detectors with
high dynamic range and operating frequencies up to 10 GHz
are available, their power consumption is high, around
100 mA, and so they are not suitable for battery powered
operation. We have fabricated a low power log detector (Figure
3. ) which has a dynamic range of greater than 40 dB (Figure 4.
) and consumes about 2 mA. Currently, the upper limit of the
dynamic range is limited by the detector breakdown voltage
(4 V) and may be improved by use of a diode with a higher
breakdown voltage.
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Figure 3. A low power, low cost detector
Figure 3. shows the radiated IEMI detector circuit driven by
a source which represents a simple dipole model [9] (L1, R6,
C4, C5). The shunt resistance R3, along with the antenna
capacitance C4 define the low cut-off frequency. In this
prototype, a positive peak detector (D1, C2, R10, & R4) with
linear response was included with a buffer amplifier in order to
allow observation of the detector output directly. A negative
peak detector (D2, C3, & R5) feeds an inverting logarithmic
amplifier which is to be used to drive a comparator and
Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC) on the microcontroller.
R12 provides a small bias to the diodes and ensures that the
inverting op-amp has a small (~25 mV) positive output so that
it functions adequately with a single supply rail. Figure 4.
Shows the measured dynamic range of the fabricated detector.
Figure 4. Dynamic range of the low-cost detector
The choice of detector RC time constant and operational
amplifier determine both the time response and power
consumption of the system. This should be matched to the
sample rate of the ADC on the microcontroller which is of the
order of 1 Msample/s. The LTC6264 amplifiers used here have
a gain bandwidth product of 180 MHz and a 90V/s slew rate
with a quiescent current of less than 1 mA. This means that the
buffer for the positive detector has a rise time of less than
20 ns. The rise time of the logarithmic amplifier depends on the
signal amplitude and is significantly slower, around 2 s. The
performance is adequate to allow envelope capture of some
pulsed waveforms. The decay time of the detector must also be
slow enough for the ADC to capture amplitude information for
shorter pulses and is currently set so the decay in one
microsecond is about 10%.
Figure 5. SPICE simulated time response of low-power, low-cost detector
for sine wave input with detector capacitors set to 100 pF
Figure 6. Simulated time response of low-power, low-cost detector for sine
wave input with detector capacitors set to 10 pF
The time response of a simple detector presents a challenge.
The detector capacitance must be charged through the antenna
capacitance. Also for smaller signals the diode conducts less
and the rise time becomes longer. The prototype constructed
uses a 100 pF capacitance which results in a detector rise-time
of about 2s. This is compatible with the logarithmic amplifier
performance as can be seen in Figure 5. The detector response
can be improved by reduction in the detector capacitance as
shown in Figure 6. However the logarithmic amplifier rise-time
is limited for small signals as it is operating with a high gain.
The buffer amplifier on the positive detector is able to follow
the faster rise time and can be used to operate a comparator for
short-pulse detection.
Kanda [9] showed that it is possible to achieve a flat
frequency response over a broad bandwidth using a simple
dipole antenna directly connected to a detector diode. This is
due to the fact that the detector charges its output capacitor
which eventually reverse-biases the diode so the antenna sees
only the diode capacitance as its load. A dipole like antenna
below resonance exhibits a purely capacitive impedance and
this acts as a frequency independent potential divider with the
diode capacitance. An 8 mm monopole has a quarter wave
resonant frequency of approximately 9 GHz and Figure 7.
shows the simulated frequency response of the monopole
driving the capacitive load of the diode. A significant dip in
antenna factor can be seen as the antenna passes through
resonance.
Figure 7. Antenna factor of 8mm monopole driving detector load
Considering Figure 4. , if we assume that -40dBm in a 50
system is the limit of useable sensitivity for the detector, then
this corresponds to a voltage of V=4.47 mV. For an 8mm
dipole with a 92 dB/m antenna factor, the corresponding
minimum detectable field sensitivity is:
 V/m17811  AFVE  
Since the antenna forms a capacitive potential divider with
the detector, the antenna factor can be controlled by modifying
the antenna capacitance. Figure 8. shows an 8 mm high antenna
with increased capacitance. We chose the shape as recent
experience in designing a broadband antenna for reverberation
chambers [11] shows that the taper at the base radiates well at
frequencies above resonance and it suppresses the effect of the
monopole resonance(s). It can be seen (Figure 9. ) that the
increase in capacitance results in a substantial reduction of
antenna factor. The reduced antenna factor of 55 dB results in
an increased sensitivity of the detector such that the minimum
detectable field is:
 V/m5.222  AFVE  
Thus the sensitivity of the detector can be adjusted by choice of
a suitable antenna capacitance.
Figure 8. An antenna with increased capacitance
Figure 9. Antenna factor for antenna with increased capacitance driving
detector load.
Figure 10. Block diagram of the IEMI identification and location system
B. Towards identification and location system
The described low cost detector system is able to determine
basic waveform features, such as whether a threat is a
continuous wave, long or short single pulse. However, it is not
capable of distinguishing between and extracting the
parameters of typical IEMI signal shapes, such as trains of sine
wave pulses, damped sine pulses, and double-exponential
pulses since IEMI signals are typically very short and exhibit
very fast rise times. Proper identification of such signals can be
accomplished in at least two ways: (i) by recording the
waveform of the signal and analyzing its shape in the time or
frequency domain offline, or (ii) by measuring and analyzing
(algorithmically) the durations of the positive and negative
half-pulses of the signal.
An identification and location system is also being
developed as part of the STRUCTURES programme. Figure
10. shows a simplified block diagram of a more complex, and
thus likely more expensive, system which can perform the
detection of the attack, the localization of a radiated IEMI
source, and the identification of the waveform of the malicious
signal. The inputs to the system are signals collected from a set
of spatially distributed field sensors. The main building blocks
are signal detectors, needed to spot the attack, and the core
signal-processing modules: waveshape identification and time-
difference measurement modules. The signal selector block
redirects one of the input signals to the output for visual
analysis. The identification module measures and analyzes the
duration of received signal half-pulses, to determine the
approximate waveshape of the IEMI signal. The time-
difference module detects the initial rising edge of the signals
from the different sensors and measures the time delay between
them. This module is crucial for calculating the location of the
source using the Time Difference of Arrival Algorithm
(TDoA). This algorithm is selected based on an analysis of the
existing localization algorithms and the simulation results
presented in [12].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have described the low cost, low power IEMI detector
system, and given a brief overview of an identification and
location system, being developed as part of the STUCTURES
Programme. This paper has focused on the design of the
radiated IEMI detector for the low cost system. The conducted
interference detector is yet to be developed.
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